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About This Report 
Metropolitan Atlanta is experiencing a foreclosure boom as the number of failed mortgages 
more than doubled in less than five years, between 2000 and 2005. These foreclosures im-
pose significant costs not only on borrowers and lenders, but also on municipal governments, 
neighboring homeowners and others with a financial interest in nearby properties. As a result, 
foreclosure avoidance strategies must involve not only federal, state and local public 
agencies, but also responsible mortgage industry officials, consumer groups, and community-
based, not-for profit organizations. 
This report was commissioned by Doug Dylla at NeighborWorks® America to help build 
awareness of foreclosure problems and craft a comprehensive foreclosure-avoidance strategy 
for metropolitan Atlanta. The work presented here serves as a companion to the Foreclosure 
Prevention Forum cosponsored by NeighborWorks® America and the Atlanta Federal 
Reserve on May 23, 2005. The forum brought together more than 150 leaders from the 
mortgage industry, state and local government, the advocacy community, and academic and 
policy researchers. These participants generated a variety of collaborative approaches to 
address issues related to mortgage failures and foreclosures in the Atlanta region.  
The report was written and researched by Mark Duda and William Apgar. It expands on 
research presented by Duda at the forum and is intended to characterize the current situation 
with respect to mortgage failures in metropolitan Atlanta, as well as previous research 
completed by the authors on foreclosure avoidance in Chicago and Los Angeles. The 
foreclosure data used in this report were generously provided by EquiSystems, LLC, 
producer of the Atlanta Foreclosure Report. 
 
Report Authors 
Mark Duda. Duda is a consultant working on issues at the interface between mortgage 
markets and community development. He has written widely on issues relating to single-
family mortgage finance and homeownership in both the U.S. and China. Duda is a Research 
Fellow at the Harvard University Joint Center for Housing Studies, where he previously 
worked as a Research Analyst. He holds a PhD in Economic Geography from Clark 
University. 
William C. Apgar. Apgar is a Senior Scholar at the Joint Center for Housing Studies of 
Harvard University, and a Lecturer in Public Policy at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of 
Government. He previously served as the Assistant Secretary for Housing/Federal Housing 
Commissioner at the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, and also chaired 
the Federal Housing Finance Board. Apgar holds a PhD in Economics from Harvard Uni-
versity.  
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Executive Summary: Foreclosure Trends and  
Public Policy Concerns in Metropolitan Atlanta 
Foreclosures are on the rise in low-income and minority neighborhoods across the country, 
and Atlanta is no exception. Many of these foreclosures impose significant costs not only on 
borrowers and lenders, but also on municipal governments, neighboring homeowners and 
others with a financial interest in nearby properties. As a result, developing appropriate fore-
closure-avoidance strategies must involve the collective effort of federal, state and local 
public agencies, working in cooperation with responsible mortgage industry officials, 
consumer groups, and community-based, not-for-profit organizations, all of whom have a 
significant stake in mitigating the problems generated by the ongoing foreclosure boom. 
Such cooperative efforts are needed both to minimize the adverse consequences of fore-
closures and to address the abusive lending practices that are at the heart of many of 
Atlanta’s foreclosure-related problems.  
Using data from the 2000 Census, the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), and 
foreclosure filings in 12 Atlanta counties, this report presents an assessment of the spatial 
distribution of foreclosure filings, the characteristics of the loans involved, and the entities 
involved in foreclosure activity. The study covers the period beginning January 2000 and 
ending in March 2005. Foreclosure filing data were obtained from EquiSystems, LLC, pub-
lishers of The Atlanta Foreclosure Report, a listing of all properties scheduled to be sold at 
the monthly foreclosure auction and the leading provider of foreclosure data for the Atlanta 
region. Since not all homes listed are ultimately sold at auction, in effect, the database is a 
comprehensive listing of properties with loans that are severely delinquent enough that they 
come within a few weeks of being offered at auction. 
The findings that emerge from this analysis fall into three categories: (1) those concerning 
the spatial distribution of foreclosure activity; (2) those concerning the extent to which ele-
vated foreclosure filing rates appear to be linked to abusive lending practices; and (3) those 
concerning the potential for public, private and not-for-profit leaders to take action to reduce 
the number of loans entering foreclosure and to minimize the costs that result from those 
foreclosures that do occur. The remainder of this summary discusses findings in these three 
areas. 
Spatial Distribution: Severe Clusters Exist, But Areas of Elevated Foreclosure Are 
Also Found Throughout Metropolitan Atlanta 
As is true elsewhere, many of Atlanta’s foreclosure filings concentrate in hotspots — 
typically urban, lower-income, minority communities with older housing stock. These areas 
saw the highest foreclosure rates anywhere in the metropolitan area. Some suburban areas are 
also hard hit, including places with high minority shares and some in newly built subdivi-
sions. Key findings from this portion of the analysis include: 
• Over the past five years, some 90,000 different homes in the 12-county study area 
were listed to be sold at the monthly foreclosure auction. This translates into roughly 
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one in ten homes with a mortgage having experienced extremely severe delinquency, 
if not full foreclosure. 
• On an annual basis, the rate of foreclosure filings is nearly twice as high in the city (3 
percent) as the suburbs (1.7 percent). Nonetheless, because there are many more sub-
urban housing units, three-quarters of all foreclosure actions over the study period 
relate to suburban homes.  
• The most intense foreclosure activity occurs in a concentrated band running east-west 
across the southern portion of the city and extending into the suburbs. Within this 
band, low-income/high and/or minority share areas have especially high filing rates.  
• Inside the I-285 perimeter, foreclosure actions were initiated on 7.8 percent of 
mortgaged homes annually in neighborhoods where median incomes were below 
$35,000 and minorities account for more than 80 percent of the population. In areas 
outside the perimeter with these same income and racial characteristics, the annual 
filing rate was 4.5 percent — well above the suburban average of 1.7 percent.  
• In mostly white areas (those where minorities are less than 20 percent of the popula-
tion) in the highest income quintile (tract median income greater than $71,000) in the 
city and suburbs, annual foreclosure filing rates were 0.5 and 0.7, respectively. 
• Despite the extremely high foreclosure rates in lowest income and largely minority 
areas, the foreclosure boom is impacting neighborhoods across the metropolitan area. 
Close to half of all foreclosure actions (38,735 of 90,109) took place in suburban 
neighborhoods that are either integrated or largely white and with incomes at or 
above Atlanta’s median. 
Abusive Lending Practices Work to Elevate Atlanta-Area Foreclosures  
Many of today’s foreclosures are an unanticipated but legitimate side effect of the long-
awaited increase in credit access among traditionally underserved borrowers and neighbor-
hoods. One natural consequence of extending credit to higher-risk borrowers is that a larger 
share of borrowers will face delinquency and default than was the case when loans were only 
made to less risky borrowers. In addition to this “natural increase” in mortgage failures, 
however, the proliferation of alternative mortgage products and origination channels on 
which the credit expansion has been built provides cover for a subset of entities engaged in 
highly foreclosure-prone lending. One sign of such activity is relatively high shares of loans 
that fail soon after origination — reflecting in many, though not all, cases inadequate 
attention to the borrower’s ability to repay.1 While “quick fail” loans can be symptomatic of 
                                                 
1 It is important to note the difference between the time it takes for a borrower to face foreclosure filing and the 
time it takes a lender to foreclose on a delinquent borrower. The first period relates to the quality of the 
underwriting and loan servicing. A borrower who quickly falls into delinquency is suggestive of a breakdown in 
oversight and/or underwriting standards. The speed at which a lender is able to execute a foreclosure action is a 
function of applicable state law. As a “non-judicial” state, Georgia allows servicers/noteholders to quickly 
(some say too quickly) pursue a foreclosure action, while consumers are afforded few legal protections that 
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originations by brokers who get paid at origination and thus have little stake in the survival of 
the loan, some quick fails occur on refinance loans to owners with considerable equity. Such 
loans pose little risk to the noteholder, even if the loan fails quickly, because any losses as 
well as substantial fees can be covered out of the proceeds of the foreclosure sale (all in 
addition to often substantial origination fees on the loan). Such practices persist due to a lack 
of due diligence among some loan funders and a regulatory environment that has not kept 
pace with the range of behaviors used to defraud vulnerable owners of their accumulated 
home equity. Findings related to these issues include the following: 
• Almost a fifth (18.8 percent) of foreclosure filings over the study period were regist-
ered either in the same year the loan was originated or the subsequent year. 
• Areas with the highest shares of nonprime lending also have the highest foreclosure 
rates. Of the 132 tracts in the highest foreclosure filing rate category, two-thirds are 
also in the highest nonprime share grouping (greater than 20 percent nonprime).  
• The nation’s largest players in the mortgage industry are the most active foreclosure 
filing entities in Atlanta’s neighborhoods with the highest filing rates. Whether they 
originated the failed loans, purchased them later, or operate in a servicing role, these 
institutions have a strong financial and reputational interest in participating in fore-
closure avoidance and loss mitigation efforts, as well as in improving origination per-
formance in these areas. 
• Loans that fail soon after origination are a larger share of overall foreclosure activity 
in high foreclosure areas. Moreover, areas where a high share of failed loans failed 
quickly are more likely to be areas of elevated levels of nonprime lending and have 
higher concentrations of minority and low-income households. 
• A handful of smaller entities have relatively high shares of their total failed loans that 
fall into the “quick foreclosure” category. Subjecting these “quick-foreclosers” to 
greater regulatory scrutiny could help establish a clearer link between potentially 
abusive lending and elevated rates of foreclosure. Such a strategy would be especially 
effective in helping to determine the cause of pockets of activity that are scattered 
across Atlanta’s suburbs, including among new homes. 
Potential for Stakeholders to Reduce Foreclosure Prevalence and Impact 
With Atlanta’s foreclosures more than doubling over the last few years, it is essential to find 
ways to minimize their associated economic and social costs that impact a wide range of 
stakeholders. In addition to their obvious impacts on distressed borrowers, foreclosures gen-
erate losses for the mortgage industry, stress already tight county and local governments that 
provide the infrastructure to conduct foreclosures and remediate their neighborhood impacts, 
                                                                                                                                                       
would enable them to engage in foreclosure-avoidance efforts. This can produce the less than desirable situation 
where an unsuspecting borrower can be lured into taking on mortgage debt with abusive terms, but once the 
consumer falls into delinquency as a result of this abuse, he or she does not have sufficient time to avoid 
foreclosure. 
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and rob equity from neighboring homeowners and others with a financial interest in foreclo-
sure-prone areas. Findings relevant to those devising policy solutions for Atlanta’s fore-
closure boom include: 
• In almost a quarter of all filings, either the Mortgage Electronic Registry System 
(MERS) or one of four major trustees is listed as the party initiating foreclosure pro-
ceedings. This lack of transparency makes it more difficult for stakeholders to react to 
foreclosure concentrations by reaching out to those with large portfolios at risk in 
vulnerable areas. Efforts to remedy this problem could begin by disclosing the name 
of the actual noteholder and servicing agent when the loan falls into serious delin-
quency as indicated by the public foreclosure listing. 
• Not knowing the foreclosing agent is a subset of the larger problem that the proper 
information necessary to make policy and take remedial action to address fore-
closures is not now available to policymakers. Such data could be produced by taking 
advantage of the infrastructure that exists at existing venders, such as EquiSystems, 
LLC, in order to minimize the burden on municipalities.  
• Better capacity to track foreclosures would enable government officials and mortgage 
industry participants to spot potential foreclosure hotspots in real time. Once a new 
hotspot is identified, stakeholders must be prepared to launch a “foreclosure hotspot 
protocol,” a plan formulated in advance of problem detection that describes specific 
actions that will minimize the negative consequences of concentrated foreclosures. 
• Many distressed borrowers could save their homes and credit standing if they knew 
where to turn for help. Chicago and Dallas are now partnering with the Credit 
Counseling Resource Center, a national alliance of HUD-certified agencies providing 
counseling help targeted at distressed mortgage borrowers. By participating in such 
an effort, Atlanta could help thousands avoid foreclosure, saving homes and credit 
reputations in the process. 
• Even the best foreclosure avoidance system and practices cannot eliminate mortgage 
failures. Communities must therefore plan to reduce the negative spillover effects 
they generate by moving these properties quickly into the hands of viable, properly 
financed homebuyers. To this end, nonprofit developers can help ensure that units are 
rehabbed to the point that they are structurally sound investments for low-income, 
first-time buyers.  
• Foreclosures often begin at origination when the borrower gets the wrong loan. Due 
to the complexity of the mortgage marketplace, borrowers need trustworthy advice 
and information in order to make informed decisions. Community groups can provide 
this service either directly or by recommending brokers committed to serving the 
borrower’s interest. The Ford Foundation recently provided funding to one company, 
The Mortgage Grader, which provides community groups with accurate pricing 
information via mortgage quotes from leading national lenders. 
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• Because many foreclosures are associated with refinance lending, often to owners 
with substantial equity, interested parties should work together to develop a simple 
and effective form of pre-refinance counseling available over the phone. Borrowers 
would essentially vet their loan terms with qualified counselors in order to determine 
if the terms are inappropriate given the borrower’s underwriting characteristics. 
Entities such as the Credit Counseling Resource Center could provide such a service 
with existing assets, with pilot funding from foundations such as the Homeownership 
Preservation Foundation. 
• Responsible lenders must continue to work with public officials to craft legislation, 
regulations and industry best practices that drive out abusive lending practices with-
out stemming the flow of credit to low-income, low-wealth and credit-impaired bor-
rowers. In the case of loans that fail soon after origination — whether due to simple 
incompetence, a lack of due diligence or intentionally abusive behavior — such enti-
ties should be restricted in their ability to push market products to vulnerable home-
owners. Armed with simple tracking statistics for this type of activity, regulators 
could be authorized to take suitable punitive action. 
• The boom in home prices, along with mortgage industry innovations and policy initi-
atives at all levels to increase homeownership, have combined to create a new class of 
inherently more vulnerable first-time homebuyer. All entities should work to ensure 
that these owners have easy access to high quality, impartial pre- and postpurchase 
ownership and credit counseling to help counteract their inherent vulnerability to loan 
failure. 
Summary 
The foreclosure picture in Atlanta is complex and opaque, making the search for solutions 
challenging. These are not excuses for inaction, however, and stakeholders in the government, 
nonprofit and private sectors have increasingly pooled their efforts to reduce foreclosures 
and/or mitigate their effects. By improving assessment mechanisms and working collabora-
tively to bring all available public and private resources to address the problem, Atlanta can 
minimize the damage experienced by the direct and indirect victims of foreclosures, and in 
the process shore up weaker housing markets and strengthen vulnerable communities.  
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Section 1: Introduction and Background 
When concentrated, mortgage foreclosures are responsible for a number of economic and 
social ills for vulnerable homeowners, and generate blight and negative spillover effects that 
threaten the stability of many low-income and low-wealth communities. Often these foreclo-
sures also expose the mortgage industry to tens of thousands of dollars in lost revenue per 
incident. The resulting shared interest in avoiding foreclosures has engendered cooperation 
among parties that have historically found themselves on opposite sides of mortgage market 
policy and regulatory issues. Reflecting this joint interest in foreclosure avoidance and loss 
mitigation, several collaborative initiatives between these stakeholders — such as Chicago’s 
Homeownership Preservation Initiative (HOPI) and the Credit Counseling Resource Center 
(CCRC) — are now up and running.  
In partnership with the Atlanta Federal Reserve, NeighborWorks® America is helping 
cultivate a similar effort in the metropolitan Atlanta region.2 Such attention is sorely needed. 
In 2004 alone more than 35,000 of the roughly 900,000 mortgaged housing units in 
metropolitan Atlanta were either foreclosed upon or endured delinquencies so severe that the 
borrower came within weeks of having the property sold at auction. Alarmingly, this level is 
more than twice as high as it was in 2000, despite a lack of powerful macroeconomic shocks 
to the regional economy.  
Because default and foreclosure tend to concentrate in specific neighborhoods, it is important 
to understand the characteristics of neighborhoods in which foreclosures are most prevalent. 
This report identifies areas of greatest concern in order that the efforts of the Atlanta area 
stakeholders in business, government and community advocacy can be most efficiently and 
effectively targeted.  
The report begins with a brief background section detailing characteristics of the Atlanta 
metropolitan area and its housing market. This is followed by a description of the dataset and 
methodological choices underpinning the analysis. The empirical portion of the report is 
based around a series of tables and maps that demonstrate the relationship between the rate of 
foreclosure filings and neighborhood socioeconomic, demographic, and locational character-
istics. It also includes an analysis of the variation in foreclosure rates based on neighborhood- 
level credit quality. It then moves to a presentation of the characteristics of failed loans. 
Finally, it investigates lending patterns in the highest foreclosure areas to understand which 
entities are most active in foreclosure-prone zones.  
Metropolitan Atlanta and Its Housing Market 
Metropolitan Atlanta is home to roughly half the population of Georgia and contains more 
than half of its owner-occupied housing (Figure 1-1). As of 2003, the ownership rates for the 
MSA and state are virtually identical. In comparison with the national homeownership rate, 
these figures are higher, though only modestly so.  
                                                 
2 This ongoing effort began with a stakeholder meeting in May 2005 hosted by the Atlanta Fed and attended by 
more than 100 government, business and community leaders. 
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Figure 1-1: Atlanta’s Demographic and Housing Characteristics in Context 
Atlanta MSA Georgia US
Population 4,386,262 8,438,203 282,909,885
Occupied Housing Units 1,631,984 3,152,672 108,419,506
Owners 1,120,357 2,151,821 72,418,662
Renters 511,627 1,000,851 36,000,844
Ownership rate 68.6 68.3 66.8
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2003 American Community Survey  
House prices in Atlanta have been rising steadily, though not spectacularly, for almost two 
decades (Figure 1-2). Increases have been more rapid since the mid-1990s, but have lagged 
behind national trends. Over the study period spanning the five years from the first quarter of 
2000 through the first quarter of 2005, prices have risen 31.2 percent in Atlanta, as against 
32.5 percent in Georgia as a whole, and 49.6 percent nationwide.  
From a foreclosure perspective, growth at this pace should have been sufficient to provide 
owners the option of selling in order to avoid foreclosure. However, because the metropolitan 
area average obscures significant county and neighborhood variation, no doubt owners in 
some submarkets did not have this option, even if they held homes for three, four or five 
years. This is particularly true for many low-income and low-wealth borrowers purchasing 
homes with little or no money down. In particular, families with limited home equity at time 
of purchase, and modest equity buildup during the ownership period, may find themselves 
unable to sell their home for enough to repay the mortgage (after accounting for broker fees), 
and cover any prepayment penalties and the deferred mortgage payments that triggered the 
delinquency in the first instance. 
Overall, metropolitan Atlanta’s foreclosure boom cannot be explained by local housing 
market conditions. Unemployment in Georgia did rise from 4.7 percent to 5.3 percent from 
June 2004 to June 2005. But this recent and modest increase does not explain why 
foreclosures have been trending up sharply since 2000. Credit quality has declined in the 
North Georgia region containing Atlanta, as personal bankruptcies in 2004 were up 80 
percent from their 1994 level, yet these declines lag similar statistics for the nation as a 
whole, which experienced a 100 percent increase over the same period. Once again, though 
declining overall credit quality may have contributed to the upward movement of 
foreclosures in the region, it can not explain why foreclosures are moving up so much faster 
in Atlanta relative to other markets in the United States.  
Adding to the importance of carefully understanding foreclosure trends in Atlanta is the fact 
that Georgia is a “non-judicial” state where the foreclosure process happens quickly.3 In 
Georgia, specific rules govern the timing of notification procedures, and state law mandates 
that properties to be auctioned are advertised for only four weeks prior to sale. Aside from 
                                                 
3 Judicial foreclosure refers simply to the fact that the foreclosure must be processed through the courts. The 
essential difference with non-judicial foreclosure is that the borrower has pre-authorized the sale of the property 
to pay off the loan balance in the event of default. (Mortgage Foreclosure Glossary, www.lawshaw.com/ 
mortgageforeclosureglossary.php.) 
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servicers’ internal loss-mitigation efforts that in some cases direct effort to curing rather than 
foreclosing on problem loans, there is little else to delay the procedure once a borrower 
defaults. 4  Unlike some other states, Georgia has no right of redemption, meaning that 
borrowers cannot reclaim their homes by repaying the outstanding mortgage balance and fees 
for a period following the foreclosure auction. Georgia law also allows deficiency judgments 
against borrowers when the amount raised by selling the property is below that owed the 
creditor. Though permitted, deficiency judgments are not common and must be applied for 
within 30 days of non-judicial sales.5  
 
Figure 1-2: Atlanta’s Steady Price Growth, 1987:1-2005:1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Figure presents nominal, not real, price levels. 
Source: Freddie Mac Conventional Mortgage House Price Index, 2005:1 release. 
 
One implication of these rules is that once a loan becomes delinquent, the period between 
filing an initial foreclosure and the actual sale of the foreclosed home can take as little as 37 
days. According to a recent assessment by the Atlanta Journal and Constitution, only Texas 
and Tennessee allow sale of foreclosed properties to move forward as quickly.6 In other 
states, following the filing of a notice to foreclose, various consumer protection regulations 
may take effect, extending the time required to complete a foreclosure to months, if not years. 
The speedy Georgia process makes it important that those charged with conducting fore-
closure avoidance initiatives do so quickly.  
                                                 
4 www.stopforeclosure.com/Georgia_Foreclosure_Law.htm.  
5 www.woodandmeredith.com/articles/georgiaforeclosurelaw.html.  
6 Carrie Teegardin, Ann Hardie and Alan Judd, Swift Foreclosures Dash the American Dream, Atlanta Journal 
Constitution, January 29, 2005. 
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Section 2: Foreclosure Trends by Neighborhood  
Socioeconomic Characteristics 
Once assessment of mortgage lending discrimination revolved around “redlining,” the issue 
of whether or not the residents of minority and/or lower-income neighborhoods had access to 
mortgage credit. With the advent of risk-based pricing and nonprime lending, credit access is 
no longer the challenge facing credit-impaired borrowers in historically underserved neigh-
borhoods. Instead, some advocates and housing industry experts argue that residents of some 
neighborhoods are systematically less likely than others to receive credit at or near the best 
terms for which they can qualify. As a result, credit pricing has replaced credit access as the 
relevant policy issue. This debate is relevant to mortgage foreclosures because higher-cost 
loans are more likely to fail and neighborhoods with more nonprime lending therefore ex-
perience higher foreclosure rates. Regardless of their source, concentrated foreclosures cause 
serious problems for neighbors, businesses and others invested in these communities.  
This section briefly describes the foreclosure data used in this report and presents an initial 
description of the characteristics of places where foreclosure rates are highest. The section 
then examines counts and rates of foreclosure filings in metro Atlanta by neighborhood 
income and racial and ethnic characteristics. 
Data and Methods 
The data used in this report are a complete list of foreclosure filings in 12 metropolitan 
Atlanta counties for the period beginning January 2000 and ending in March 2005 (Map 2-1 
on page 5). Records enter the database following borrower default when the noteholder or 
noteholder’s agent begins the formal process of foreclosure. The data were obtained from 
EquiSystems, LLC, publishers of The Atlanta Foreclosure Report, a subscription-based 
monthly summary of properties to be sold at the subsequent month’s foreclosure auction 
(held the first Tuesday of each month).7 Not all properties listed to be sold at auction are 
ultimately offered and/or sold. EquiSystems estimates that only 30 percent of the records in 
their database result in consummated foreclosures. As a result, the database is a 
comprehensive listing of properties with loans that are in severe enough delinquency that 
either the foreclosure auction is completed or they come within a few weeks of being offered 
at a foreclosure auction by the noteholder. 
In order to prepare the raw EquiSystems data for analysis, we took several steps to clean the 
data. These included eliminating duplicate records or loans with unusually small or large loan 
amounts, imputing census-tract identifiers for records with incomplete geocoding, and elimi-
nating one county (Hall County) for which EquiSystems provides data but for which we 
could not obtain matching building permit data needed in the analysis.8  
The primary methodological decision underpinning much of the analysis presented in this 
report concerns the denominator used to construct foreclosure rates at the census-tract level.  
                                                 
7 www.equisystems.com/page_2.htm.  
8 The data cleaning is described in detail in the Appendix. 
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Map 2-1: Metropolitan Atlanta: The 12 County Study Area 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While the EquiSystems dataset represents a complete count of serious delinquencies and 
foreclosures in Atlanta — the numerator in the rate calculation — it does not provide esti-
mates of the total number of loans outstanding. The 2000 Census of Population and Housing 
provides tract-level estimates of the number of homeowners with a mortgage, but these esti-
mates are somewhat out of date. The uneven rate at which the housing stock expands in 
different areas made it important to update the 2000 Census figures on the number of mort-
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gages in each tract in order that our foreclosure rates not be biased downward in tracts where 
the housing stock was expanding.  
Since we do not have tract- or county-level information on mortgage lending growth over the 
study period, we used the rate of building permit issuance to proxy for it. Because permit 
data are aggregated to the county level, we multiplied the number of mortgages outstanding 
as of 2000 at the tract level by the county-level increase in permits during the study period. 
This yields an estimate of the number of loans outstanding that reflects some, though not all, 
of the neighborhood-level variation in lending growth since 2000.  
Several other methodological issues are more straightforward. We use the terms “city” and 
“suburb” as shorthand for the local terms “inside the perimeter” and “outside the perimeter,” 
that is, inside or outside the I-285 beltway (Map 2-1). The beltway encircles large portions of 
Fulton and Dekalb counties as well as slivers of Cobb and Clayton counties. Tracts either 
fully (183) or partially (10) inside the beltway are considered “city” and the remainder (391) 
are considered “suburban.” Minority status is defined such that it includes all individuals 
except those that identify as both “white alone” and “not Hispanic.” African Americans are 
those who identify as both “black alone” and “not Hispanic.”  
The database created through these methodological decisions is divided with roughly one-
quarter of all records in the city and the three-quarters in the suburbs. As Figure 2-1 indicates, 
this distribution is skewed more toward the city than the overall distribution of mortgaged 
units, only 15.1 percent of which are located in the city. As a result, the foreclosure rate — 
the share of mortgages that were listed for auction at least once during the five-year study 
period — was 15.9 percent (3 percent annually) inside the perimeter, well above the 9 
percent (1.7 percent annually) rate outside. Other characteristics of the database and their 
spatial variation are discussed in the following section as appropriate to understand the 
results presented in each section. 
Figure 2-1: Summary of Foreclosure Records, 2000:1-2005:1 
 
 
 
 
Note: City and suburbs based on Census-tract location inside or outside the I-285 beltway. Mortgaged units based on 2000 
Census tract-level counts for all types of mortgages advanced by 2000–2004 county-level growth in building permits.  
Sources: EquiSystems, LLC; Census 2000. 
Characteristics of High-Foreclosure Tracts 
As an introduction to foreclosure patterns in metropolitan Atlanta it is helpful to examine the 
average characteristics of tracts with different rates of foreclosure filings per mortgaged unit. 
Tracts that score highly on this measure are places where mortgage borrowers are more likely 
to default and where loans originated are more foreclosure-prone.  
(#) (%) (#) (%) Total Annual
City 21,601          24.0              135,652        15.1              15.9 3.0
Suburbs 68,348          76.0             762,707      84.9            9.0 1.7
Total 89,949          100.0            898,359        100.0            10.0 1.9
Foreclosure Filings Mortgaged UnitsLocation Filing Rate
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Figure 2-2 presents characteristics of tracts based on filing rate quartiles (i.e., the highest 
quartile contains the tracts in which loan failures are most likely, and the lowest quartile the 
tracts where they are least likely). The upper panel of the table indicates that the number of 
foreclosure filings in high-rate tracts is well above the number in any of the other quartile 
groupings. The difference in filing rates is dramatic. At 5.3 percent the annual rate in these 
tracts is more than twice as high as that in the next highest quartile. It is more than four times 
higher than the second quartile and more than eight times higher than the lowest quartile. 
Over the study period more than a quarter of loans in highest foreclosure filing rate tracts 
encountered severe defaults, meaning that the property came at least within three weeks of 
being sold at auction. The upshot of these findings is that loans originated in some tracts are 
more than eight times as likely as loans in other tracts to encounter serious delinquency. 
 Figure 2-2: Characteristics of High Foreclosure Rate Neighborhoods 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Foreclosure filings are for the period 2001:1–2005:1. Filing rates are based on number of mortgaged units estimated from 
2000 Census level advanced by 2000–2004 county-level growth in building permits.  
Sources: EquiSystems, LLC; Census 2000. 
 
The lower panel of the table presents characteristics of the tracts in each foreclosure filing 
rate grouping. It shows that high-foreclosure-rate tracts tend to have relatively smaller shares 
of their housing stock in owner occupation. They also have much larger shares of lending by 
nonprime lending specialists.9 In terms of demographic characteristics the results are striking, 
with the minority share in high-foreclosure tracts at 88.5 percent. This compares with just 20 
percent in the least-foreclosure-prone areas. The average of tract median household incomes 
in the highest grouping ($30,681) is less than half as much as in the lowest foreclosure rate 
group ($75,202).  
These results suggest several avenues for further inquiry. In particular they highlight the need 
for a more detailed examination of the factors associated with variation in the rate of 
neighborhood-level foreclosure filings. The next section begins this exercise by focusing on 
income levels by census tract. 
                                                 
9 The classification of loans as “nonprime” is based on HUD’s categorization of lender specializations, which 
labels all the activity of HMDA filers as “prime,” “nonprime,” or “manufactured housing,” based on the focus 
of the lenders’ activities. 
Lowest Second Third Highest
Number of Tracts (#) 144          146          145          144          
Foreclosure Filings (#) 8,781       20,025     27,312     33,807     
Annual Foreclosure Filing Rate (%) 0.6           1.3           2.5           5.3           
Owner Occupied Share (%) 70.4         68.9         60.9         54.8         
Non-prime Share (%) 5.6           7.8           12.9         21.7         
Minority Share (%) 20.0         28.5         56.5         88.5         
African American Share (%) 7.3           13.5         43.2         81.5         
Average Tract Household Median Income ($) 75,202     56,929     44,885     30,681     
Foreclosure Filing Rate QuartileTract Characteristic
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Filing Patterns by Tract Income Quintile 
Splitting the data into city-suburban location and quintiles based on census-tract median 
income reveals a number of interesting characteristics of metropolitan Atlanta’s foreclosure 
pattern (Figure 2-3). (As noted in the data section “city” is defined as census tracts being 
entirely or partially inside of the I-285 perimeter.) In the city, low-income areas had the 
largest number of foreclosure filings — 13,453 accounting for 62.3 percent of all city filings. 
In the suburbs, the reverse is true, with just 4.2 percent of filings occurring on properties 
located in lowest income quintile tracts. These differences obviously reflect the fact that the 
city contains many more of metropolitan Atlanta’s lower-income neighborhoods.  
 Figure 2-3: Foreclosure Filing Rates Decline as Neighborhood Income Rises 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Income quintiles are for the entire 12-county study area. Mortgaged units are estimated from 2000 Census levels advanced 
by 2000–2004 county-level growth in building permits. Foreclosure filings are for the period 2000:1–2005:1, so that annual rates 
are derived by dividing total rate by 5.25.  
Sources: EquiSystems, LLC; Census 2000. 
  
By far the highest overall filing rate appears in the lowest-income quintile tracts in the city, 
where 7.4 percent of loans either failed or came extremely close to doing so annually over 
the five-year study period. This is more than twice the rate of filings as occurred in lowest-
income quintile neighborhoods outside of the I-285 beltway. Filing volumes in the suburbs 
are indeed high, but due to the large number of mortgaged units, filing rates are modest in 
the income quintiles where most suburban foreclosures take place. 
Filing Patterns by Tract Minority Share 
This section discusses a table similar to the previous one but with rows based on tract 
minority share instead of income. Figure 2-4 indicates that for both city and suburbs, filing 
rates increase steadily with tract minority percentage. In the city, the 0.5 percent annual rate 
in mostly white areas rises to 6 percent in mostly nonwhite places. In suburbs the rate climbs 
from 1.1 to 4.1 percent. Areas more than 80 percent nonwhite saw 33,234 foreclosure filings 
(36.9 percent of all filings) despite having only 14.4 percent of all housing units. Although 
mostly white tracts in the suburbs saw 19,312 filings — the most of any single cell in the 
table — such areas have 39 percent of metro Atlanta’s mortgaged housing units and hence 
modest foreclosure filing rates. Interestingly, however, suburban foreclosure rates are higher 
than city ones except in mostly minority tracts.  
In sum, Figure 2-4 indicates a clear relationship between tract minority share and foreclosure 
rates. In the suburbs, volumes are high across all groupings, but rates increase steadily with 
City Suburbs City Suburbs City Suburbs
Less than $35,346 13,453      2,841        34,542      16,298      7.4 3.3
$35,346 - $45168 4,155        11,170      31,167      81,435      2.5 2.6
$45,169 - $55,712 2,031        20,487      26,142      164,571    1.5 2.4
$55,713 - $70,714 1,169        21,972      18,114      233,394    1.2 1.8
More than $70,714 794           11,879    25,687    267,010  0.6 0.8
Total 21,601      68,348      135,652    762,707    3.0 1.7
Foreclosure Filings Mortgaged Units Annualized Fcl. Filing Rate   (%)Tract Income Quintile
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 Figure 2-4: Tract Racial Composition Linked to Foreclosure Propensity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Income quintiles are for the entire 12-county study area. Mortgaged units are estimated from 2000 Census levels advanced 
by 2000–2004 county-level growth in building permits. Foreclosure filings are for the period 2000:1–2005:1, so that annual rates 
are derived by dividing total rate by 5.25.  
Sources: EquiSystems, LLC; Census 2000. 
 
nonwhite share. In the city, foreclosures are very much a phenomenon of high minority 
neighborhoods, which saw 78.4 percent of all city foreclosure filings — well ahead of their 
23.9 percent share of the mortgaged urban housing stock. In fact, the foreclosure rate in city 
neighborhoods that are more than 80 percent nonwhite is almost 1.5 times higher than even 
ones that are between 60 and 80 percent nonwhite. Even though foreclosure filing activity is 
high in mostly minority tracts in both cities and suburbs, the rate in city areas is 46.7 percent 
higher than suburban ones.  
Income and Racial Patterns 
The discussion of the two previous tables has considered income and race separately. 
However, because income and race are correlated it is useful to examine both factors simul-
taneously. This section looks at the extent to which neighborhood racial characteristics are 
related to foreclosure rates when income is controlled for. The analysis here is too crude to 
unearth evidence of differential treatment or impact due to actions such as race-based deploy-
ment of foreclosure-prone mortgage products and/or differential servicing practices, which 
would require controlling for a number of factors other than neighborhood income. However, 
they are of interest in the context of the NeighborWorks® America–Atlanta Fed initiative 
because they can potentially help refine the targeting of foreclosure avoidance and remedi-
ation efforts.  
Figure 2-5 shows that within each tract income quintile, increasing minority share increases 
the foreclosure filing rate. This holds across both the city and the suburbs. In the city the 
highest annual foreclosure filing rate — 7.8 percent — is reached in the lowest-income 
quintile tracts with the highest minority shares. Above this income level, rates are less than 
half as high in mostly minority tracts and, interestingly, are stable as tract income increases. 
In the suburb panel, the highest filing rate cell is again the mostly minority, lowest-income 
quintile one, but the 4.5 percent annual rate there is only marginally above several others, 
including middle-income, mostly minority tracts (4.4 percent) and upper-middle-income 
tracts that are 60 to 80 percent minority (4.1 percent). 
Three significant results emerge from Figure 2-5. The first is the fact that when neighbor-
hood income is held constant, foreclosure filing rates increase as tract minority percentage 
City Suburbs City Suburbs City Suburbs
Less than 20% non-white 946           19,312      33,798      349,963    0.5 1.1
20-40% 1,551        14,330      29,185      195,494    1.0 1.4
40-60% 917           10,605      9,407        91,570      1.9 2.2
60-80% 1,255        7,798        9,778        50,147      2.4 3.0
More than 80% non-white 16,932      16,302    53,484    75,534    6.0 4.1
Total 21,601      68,348      135,652    762,707    3.0 1.7
Tract Racial/Ethnic 
Composition
Foreclosure Filings Mortgaged Units
Annualized Fcl. Filing 
Rate   (%)
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 Figure 2-5: Annual Foreclosure Rates by Tract Race Controlling for Tract Income 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Cells with fewer than 200 filings are suppressed. 
Sources: EquiSystems, LLC; 2000 Census. 
 
rises. The second concerns the severity of foreclosure problems in mostly minority low-
income urban areas. These neighborhoods in the city have filing rates suggesting that one 
mortgaged property in 12 is threatened with foreclosure each year. Third, suburban tracts 
with high minority concentrations face substantial foreclosure challenges, as more than 4 
percent of loans in such places face foreclosure filing each year. 
Figure 2-6 groups the data from the previous table and presents filing counts as well as rates. 
The race groupings are such that there are now two tract categories — more than 60 percent 
minority and less than 60 percent minority. For income the two groups are formed by 
combining tracts in the bottom two income quintiles and tracts in the top three income 
quintiles.  
The left panel showing filing volumes indicates that low-income, high-minority areas saw the 
overwhelming share (76.2 percent) of the 21,601 filings in the city. This is reflected in a 
much higher annual foreclosure rate (6 percent) in these areas relative to the other income-
race combinations. Higher-income tracts with more than 60 percent minority residents had a 
rate just under half as high (2.9 percent). In areas where the minority share is below 60 
percent and incomes are lower, the rate declines to 1.6 percent, and it reaches its lowest level 
(0.7 percent) in higher income areas with greater white shares. 
Examining the suburban panel shows that volume is greatest in higher-income areas with 
fewer minorities. Because these areas have the vast majority of metro Atlanta’s owner-
occupied housing and mortgages, however, rates are actually lowest in these places. The 
15,552 filings in higher-income, high-minority-share places translates into an annual filing 
rate of 4 percent — higher than the 3.2 percent rate in lower-income, high-minority-share 
suburban communities. Both groupings with lower minority shares had lower filing rates,  
 
Tract Minority Composition
City
Less than 
$35,346
$35,346 - 
$45,168
$45,169 - 
$55,712
$55,713 - 
$70,714
More than 
$70,714
Less than 20% non-white - - - 0.7 0.5
20-40% - 1.4 0.9 0.8 1.1
40-60% 3.8 1.9 - - -
60-80% 5.1 1.9 - - -
More than 80% non-white 7.8 3.7 3.6 3.4 -
Suburbs
Less than 20% non-white - 1.7 1.7 1.2 0.7
20-40% 2.1 2.0 1.5 1.6 1.0
40-60% 2.7 2.7 2.3 1.6 3.0
60-80% 3.4 2.6 3.0 4.1 -
More than 80% non-white 4.5 3.7 4.4 4.0 -
Tract Median Income (Quintiles)
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 Figure 2-6: Filing Counts and Rates by Income and Race Groupings  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Sources: EquiSystems, LLC; 2000 Census. 
 
though in both cases these rates are higher than in the equivalent groupings in the city. These 
findings mirror findings from previous studies on foreclosures.10 
Rather than looking at foreclosure rates, Figure 2-7 looks at nonprime lending shares by 
income and race.11  The figure indicates that within each income grouping the share of 
nonprime lending increases with tract minority share. The highest share, 26 percent, is in the 
lowest-income quintile tracts that have more than 80 percent minority residents. Conversely, 
the lowest share, 6 percent, is in the highest-income quintile tracts where minorities are no 
more than 20 percent of the population. 
 Figure 2-7: Nonprime Lending Share by Income and Race 
 Sources: EquiSystems, LLC; 2000 Census; 2001–2002 HMDA. 
 
As noted earlier, nonprime lending tends to be highest in areas with highest minority share. 
This finding holds in tracts of varying income levels. Interestingly, for a given racial category 
there little variation across the income categories. For instance, for the four income quintiles 
for which tracts with less than 20 percent minority residents exist, all fall between 6 and 8.3 
percent. Similarly, in the tracts with more than 80 percent minority residents, nonprime 
shares range from 20.6 to 26 percent. The tendency for nonprime lending to be most common 
in minority areas is partially explained by differential credit quality. The fact that these 
differences do not narrow in areas of higher income is the type of result that fuels advocates’ 
                                                 
10 For example, see M. Duda and W.C. Apgar. 2004. Foreclosure Trends in Los Angeles: Patterns and Policy 
Issues. 
11 Nonprime share is based on HUD’s lender specialization list for activity during the years 2001 and 2002. 
Tract Minority Composition
CITY
Bottom 2 
Income 
Quintiles
Top 3 
Income 
Quintiles
Bottom 2 
Income 
Quintiles
Top 3 
Income 
Quintiles
Less than 60% minority 1,145         2,269         1.6             0.7             
More than 60% minority 16,463       1,725         6.0             2.9             
SUBURBS
Less than 60% minority 5,462         38,785       2.3             1.3             
More than 60% minority 8,549         15,552       3.2             4.0             
Number of Filings Annual Filing Rate
Tract Minority Composition
Less than 
$35,346
$35,346 - 
$45168
$45,169 - 
$55,712
$55,713 - 
$70,714
More than 
$70,714
Less than 20% non-white - 6.6 8.3 7.3 6.0
20-40% 8.0 7.8 7.0 7.6 6.3
40-60% 10.8 10.5 10.4 9.6 15.0
60-80% 15.2 11.6 11.5 20.5 -
More than 80% non-white 26.0 21.3 20.6 21.8 -
Tract Median Income (Quintiles)
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allegations that some nonprime lenders target minority communities for deployment of mort-
gage products with costs higher than necessary to appropriately compensate for the risk pre-
sented by these borrowers.  
Mapping Foreclosure Patterns 
This section enriches the results presented above by mapping the pattern of foreclosure 
filings in metropolitan Atlanta. Map 2-2 begins by showing the distribution of foreclosure 
filing rates in the 12 county study area. The four groupings are for the entire study period (i.e., 
they are not annual rates). The map shows that tracts in both the lowest and highest rate 
groupings are concentrated in different regions of the metropolitan area. Low foreclosure 
filing rate tracts exist in a large cluster in the northern portion of the city and the north central 
suburbs. They also appear in the suburbs to the far south. High foreclosure tracts are located 
in a band across the southern portion of the city and extend well into suburban portions of 
Dekalb County. Additional pockets of high filing activity appear in the far northern and east-
ern suburbs, though at rates somewhat below those in the belt running east-west across 
Fulton and Dekalb counties. 
As described above, high-foreclosure rate areas tend to have high minority shares and low 
average incomes. In order to visualize the extent to which places with all of these charac-
teristics are clustered and hence mostly likely to generate negative spillovers, Map 2-3 
overlays the foreclosure rate information from Map 2-2 with income and race information. 
On Map 2-3 there are three types of tracts: (1) Low-Income/High Minority/Not Highest 
Foreclosure Filing (i.e., those in the lowest income quintile, with minority shares of at least 
80 percent and foreclosure rates below 20 percent for the study period (eight tracts colored 
green); (2) High Foreclosure without both Low-Income and High Minority Share (62 tracts 
colored blue); (3) High Foreclosure/Low-Income/High Minority Share (78 tracts colored red).  
The focus of Map 2-3 is on the red tracts, which are sufficiently concentrated and have 
foreclosure problems sufficiently severe that we label this a “hotspot” where foreclosure 
remediation efforts from local government, the mortgage industry and neighborhood 
advocates should be marshaled urgently. The minority share in these tracts combined is 94.6 
percent (87.9 percent African American) and average tract median income is $22,409. Based 
on these figures it is clear that this zone is already the target of numerous neighborhood 
revitalization efforts and other area-based policies such as CRA and the GSE affordable-
lending goals. To the extent that foreclosures are penetrating such places at extreme levels, 
they are undoubtedly undoing the positive impacts of years of painstaking policy 
interventions, further supporting the need for urgent action in these places. 
Collectively, the two maps emphasize the concentration issues suggested by the tabular 
results. Not only are high-foreclosure-rate tracts linked by their low incomes and high 
minority shares, but they are also located near, if not adjacent to, one another. This outcome 
is in keeping with foreclosure patterns elsewhere and supports the notion that a foreclosure 
contagion dynamic exists in which one foreclosure heightens the likelihood of others nearby. 
This dynamic is generally an urban phenomenon because it relies on high-density settlement 
in order for the negative impacts of unsightliness, crime, and vacancy to spread. The upshot 
for foreclosure remediation is that effort and resources must be targeted geographically. 
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Map 2-2: High Filing Rate Neighborhoods Are Highly Concentrated 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Foreclosure rates are per mortgaged unit and are based on all foreclosure activity 2000:1–2005:1. 
Loans that enter the foreclosure process more than once are only featured once in the database. Denominator 
used to calculate rates is calculated by adjusting 2000 Census tract-level mortgage counts by five-year 
building permit growth at the county level.  
 
Sources: EquiSystems, LLC; 2000 Census. 
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Map 2-3: The Overlap Between Income, Race and Foreclosure Activity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary 
The results presented in Section 2 show that Atlanta’s foreclosure problems are more severe 
in areas with lower incomes and larger shares of minority residents. Many areas with these 
characteristics are located inside the city and, broadly speaking, it is clear that metropolitan 
Atlanta’s foreclosure-related policy challenges are most intense in urban areas. This is due 
not only to the volume and rate of loan failures in the city, but also their spatial concentration. 
Foreclosures in most suburban areas — though their numbers are large in absolute terms — 
appear generally to be less concentrated. It is impossible to know definitively because many 
tracts are large and could potentially contain pockets of concentrated activity that get 
swamped by the much larger areas without such concentrations. In general, however, sub-
urban tracts have low foreclosures rates and little evidence of the type of foreclosure conta-
gion that generates severe negative consequences for communities and the mortgage industry. 
No doubt, however, some suburban neighborhoods are facing foreclosure problems similar to 
those in the city. These places are generally united by their high minority shares. Taken 
together these findings indicate that there is work to be done in both cities and suburbs to 
help prevent the wide ranging problems that emerge from concentrated mortgage failures.  
 
Mortgage Foreclosures in Atlanta: Patterns and Policy Issues 
15 
Section 3: Trends in High Foreclosure Rate Areas 
One consequence of the expansion of nonprime mortgages for higher risk borrowers is fore-
closure: by definition riskier borrowers are likely to experience a higher rate of loan failure 
than less risky, prime-rate borrowers. In combination with the changed industrial organi-
zation of the mortgage credit delivery system, and particularly the growing importance of 
mortgage brokers, there is a growing concern that the expansion of credit to higher-risk 
borrowers has brought with it new potential for abusive lending practices and the foreclosure 
problems that result. Fortunately, a strong coalescence of interests has emerged around 
foreclosure avoidance. Because foreclosures are expensive to the mortgage industry as well 
as to borrowers, neighborhoods and local governments — especially when they occur in 
geographically concentrated patterns — everyone involved has an incentive to avoid this 
most severe form of loan failure.  
This section presents information on the leading foreclosure filers in metro Atlanta — 
entities with the most to gain from foreclosure avoidance efforts in the region. It then 
narrows focus to tracts with high foreclosure rates, mapping them and looking at the leading 
foreclosure filing entities in such places. The final part of this section narrows the focus still 
more, to examine the source of high foreclosure rates: loans that fail soon after origination. It 
examines the relationship between quick entry into foreclosure and other loan characteristics 
and presents summary information on the tracts with high shares of these loans. Finally, it 
looks at the pattern of activity among entities with large shares of quick foreclosures in high 
foreclosure rate areas. 
Leading Foreclosure-Filing Entities in Metropolitan Atlanta 
A key policy issue in the foreclosure arena concerns the municipalities’ ability to determine 
who is doing the foreclosing in areas where foreclosure activity is most intense. In Fulton 
County and other places with foreclosure problems, the fact that entities without the legal 
ability to make servicing decisions are registered with the county has been identified as a 
major obstacle to municipal foreclosure-avoidance efforts. In order to assess the prevalence 
of this issue in the 12-county study area, Figure 3-1 ranks the top foreclosure filing entities 
by volume. All activities of holding companies are grouped, and the components of merged 
institutions are combined.  
Figure 3-1 shows that the 24 entities with at least 500 filings were responsible for more than 
three-quarters of filings during the study period. At the top of the list is the Mortgage 
Electronic Registration System (MERS) — named as the foreclosing agent on 16.1 percent of 
all filings. MERS is in fact not a single entity but rather a registration convenience used by 
many mortgage market entities that allows them to avoid re-registering the loan with county 
records offices each time it is sold.12 
                                                 
12 MERS is designed to streamline procedures associated with re-registration of county documents when mort-
gages are sold after origination. Loans can be registered with MERS as nominee for both lender and servicer at 
origination or some later date, and if either or both subsequently change new paperwork is not required. In the 
case of foreclosure, representatives of the servicer are in effect deputized as agents of MERS and thus the 
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 Figure 3-1: Leading Foreclosure Filing Entities in Atlanta Institutions 
Exceeding 500 Filings, 2000:1–2005:1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The same difficulty in determining the noteholder’s identity is caused when the trustee is 
registered with the county. Four of the 24 entities in Figure 3-1 are, in fact, trustees, and as 
such, have a very minor role in the mortgage process. The four trustees in the figure (Bank of 
New York, Deutsche Bank, Banker’s Trust, and Manufacturers and Traders Trust) 
collectively account for 7.2 percent of all foreclosure filings in the 12 counties over the five 
year study period. Adding this to the MERS share indicates that 23.3 percent of all fore-
closure filings during the five-year study period were made in the name of entities that have 
no ability to engage in foreclosure-avoidance and loss-mitigation activities on these defaulted 
                                                                                                                                                       
servicer and not MERS takes responsibility for the unit in the case where the foreclosing entity submits the 
winning bid at auction.  
Institution Filings
Share of All 
Records
Mortgage Electronic Registry System 14,467 16.1
JP Morgan Chase 12,352 13.7
Wells Fargo 6,770 7.5
Washington Mutual 4,128 4.5
Countrywide 3,545 3.9
Bank of America 2,974 3.0
CitiGroup 2,882 3.2
Bank of NY 2,414 2.7
Deutsche Bank 2,245 2.5
National City 2,122 2.4
First Horizon 1,570 1.7
MidFirst Bank 1,436 1.6
US Bank 1,364 1.5
GMAC 1,650 1.8
ABN/AMRO 1,241 1.4
Bankers Trust 1,173 1.3
Homeside 1,164 1.3
FNMA 983 1.1
HSBC 825 0.9
Wachovia 1,533 0.9
Manufacturers and Traders Trust 642 0.7
Union Planters Bank 629 0.7
Principal Residential 552 0.6
Fairbanks/Select Portfolio Servicing 510 0.6
Total for Institutions in This Table 68,848 76.4
Overall Total 90,109 100.0
Note: Activities of holding companies and institutions that later merged are grouped.
Source: Equisystems, LLC.  
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loans. To the extent that local government and neighborhood advocacy groups want to pro-
actively engage with the mortgage industry on behalf of distressed neighborhoods and their 
residents, they face a challenge even in finding someone with whom to begin the conver-
sation. 
The remaining entities in Figure 3-1 include the nation’s largest financial services companies, 
as well as some regional powerhouses. Their presence is unsurprising given the size and 
scope of their activities. It is important to recognize that their presence on the list does not 
imply that they originated the now failed loan. Many loans are originated by mortgage 
brokers or correspondents and quickly sold to wholesalers, who in turn pool and sell loans 
into the secondary market. Yet whether they originated the loan or not, the fact that these 
major institutions are actively engaged in so many foreclosures in the Atlanta metropolitan 
area suggests that they have a strong interest in partnering in the effort to minimize the 
impact that foreclosures in “hotspot” neighborhoods. In addition to bearing the costs 
associated with being the noteholder on a failed loan, their economic interest can also be 
harmed by mortgage failures on other loans in hotspot areas, since the concentration of 
mortgage failures may serve to lower property values or otherwise weaken the collateral 
value of their loans. 
Activity in Tracts With High Foreclosure Rates 
As noted throughout this report, not all foreclosures are equally damaging. Those occurring 
in robust housing submarkets far from other problem loans and lending have few negative 
external effects and invite little in the way of public-policy intervention. In places where 
foreclosures concentrate, however, the costs imposed on entities that are not parties to the 
mortgage transaction — including municipalities, neighboring owners and other mortgage 
industry participants invested in the area — are sufficiently high that governments have 
begun working on ways to address them.13 This section looks only at foreclosure filing 
activity in the tracts with five-year foreclosure rates above 20 percent. These tracts experi-
enced 34.5 percent of all foreclosure filings in the 12-county study area but had just 12.4 
percent of its mortgages.  
Figure 3-2 shows that concentration is once again significant, with the 22 entities with at 
least 250 filings in tracts with high foreclosure rates responsible for 73.9 percent of all filings 
there. MERS is again at the top of the list and it, along with the entities that function pri-
marily as trustees, account for a similarly large share (24.1 percent) of all filings in tracts 
with high filing rates as they did in the overall study area.  
                                                 
13 See William C. Apgar, Mark Duda, and Rochelle Nawrocki-Gorey, The Municipal Cost of Foreclosures: A 
Chicago Case Study (http://www.hpfonline.org/press/Apgar-Duda%20Study%20Full%20Version.pdf) for a 
discussion of the negative spillovers associated with concentrated foreclosures. 
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Figure 3-2: Filing Volume Leaders in Tracts with High Filing Rates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Number of 
Filings 
Share of 
High Fcl. 
Rate Tract 
Filings
 Number of 
Filings 
Share in 
High Fcl. 
Rate Tracts 
Mortgage Electronic Registry System 4,852         15.6 14,467       33.5          
JP Morgan Chase 3,831         12.3 12,352       31.0          
  Chase Manhattan Mortgage 1,690                  5.4 6,402                  26.4                    
  BankOne 1,144                  3.7 3,326                  34.4                    
  JP Morgan Chase 533                     1.7 1,366                  39.0                    
  Chase Manhattan Bank 370                     1.2 936                     39.5                    
  Chase Home Finance 94                       0.3 322                     29.2                    
Wells Fargo 2,275         7.3 6,770         33.6          
  Wells Fargo Bank 1,352                  4.4 3,700                  36.5                    
  Wells Fargo Home Mortgage 713                     2.3 2,559                  27.9                    
  Norwest 210                     0.7 511                     41.1                    
Washington Mutual 1,313         4.2 4,128         31.8          
  Washington Mutual Bank 1,265                  4.1 4,043                  31.3                    
  Long Beach Mortgage 48                       0.2 85                       56.5                    
CitiGroup 1,174         3.8 2,882         40.7          
  CitiBank 159                     0.5 439                     36.2                    
  CitiMortgage 209                     0.7 703                     29.7                    
  CitiFinancial Mortgage 641                     2.1 1,433                  44.7                    
  Associates 165                     0.5 307                     53.7                    
Countrywide 1,106         3.6 3,545         31.2          
Deutsche Bank 963           3.1 2,245         42.9          
Bank of NY 878           2.8 2,414         36.4          
National City 788           2.5 2,122         37.1          
  National City Mortgage 711                     2.3 1,802                  39.5                    
  National City Bank 12                       0.0 55                       21.8                    
  National City Home Loan 65                       0.2 205                     31.7                    
Bank of America 838           2.7 2,974         28.2          
  Bank of America 441                     1.4 1,735                  25.4                    
  BA Mortgage 204                     0.7 725                     28.1                    
  Fleet 94                       0.3 276                     34.1                    
  NationsBank 8                         0.0 29                       27.6                    
  NationsBank Mortgage 14                       0.0 32                       43.8                    
  NationsCredit 77                       0.2 177                     43.5                    
US Bank 561           1.8 1,364         41.1          
MidFirst Bank 536           1.7 1,436         37.3          
Bankers Trust 523           1.7 1,173         44.6          
ABN/AMRO 510           1.6 1,241         41.1          
  ABN/AMRO Mortgage 344                     1.1 822                     41.8                    
  LaSalle Bank 166                     0.5 419                     39.6                    
Wachovia 509           1.6 1,533         33.2          
  Wachovia Bank 235                     0.8 776                     30.3                    
  Wachovia Mortgage 10                       0.0 33                       30.3                    
  First Union 264                     0.9 724                     36.5                    
GMAC 498           1.6 1,650         30.2          
  GMAC Mortgage 327                     1.1 1,204                  27.2                    
  Residential Funding Corporation 36                       0.1 102                     35.3                    
  Homecomings Financial Network 135                     0.4 344                     39.2                    
Homeside Lending 428           1.4 1,164         36.8          
First Horizon 302           1.0 1,570         19.2          
FNMA 281           0.9 983           28.6          
Manufacturers and Traders Trust 277           0.9 642           43.1          
HSBC 266           0.9 825           32.2          
  HSBC Bank 35                       0.1 111                     31.5                    
  HSBC Mortgage 20                       0.1 118                     16.9                    
  Household Realty 167                     0.5 489                     34.2                    
  Household Finacial/Bank 44                       0.1 107                     41.1                    
Fairbanks/Select Portfolio Servcing 251           0.8 510           49.2          
  Fairbanks 237                     0.8 476                     49.8                    
  Select Portfolio Servicing 15                       0.0 34                       44.1                    
Total for Institutions in this Figure 22,960         73.9 67,990         33.8            
Overall Total 31,049         100.0 90,109         34.5            
Source: Equisystems, LLC.
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As a group, there is little difference between the share of these institutions’ filings that is in 
high-foreclosure tracts (33.8 percent) and the overall share that high-foreclosure tracts repre-
sent in the database (34.5 percent). Of the 22 entities listed in the figure, however, seven 
exceed 40 percent. This group is led by Fairbanks (now Select Portfolio Servicing) with just 
under half of its foreclosure filings located in high-foreclosure-rate areas.  
Another aspect of the mortgage market reflected in the figure is the fact that large mortgage 
entities operate multiple business units even in the same area. Examining CitiGroup, for 
instance, shows that its overall 40.7 percent share of filings located in high-foreclosure areas 
is actually the product of CitiMortgage’s and CitiBank’s 29.7 and 36.2 percent shares and 
those of CitiFinancial Mortgage and Associates (a nonprime lender purchased by CitiGroup) 
are significantly higher (44.7 and 53.7 percent). The same is true for several of the other, 
larger banking entities.  
Overall, Figure 3-2 confirms the expansive reach of the nation’s largest mortgage market 
entities. These institutions have the means to operate not only in the easy-to-serve prime 
lending markets, but also in the more challenging high-foreclosure districts of metropolitan 
areas such as Atlanta. The extent of their involvement in areas where foreclosure is most 
likely provides them with a strong financial incentive to participate in foreclosure-avoidance 
and loss-mitigation efforts devised by nonprofits and municipalities. Such activities are 
underway elsewhere, most notably in Chicago, and have already been shown to improve out-
comes for all participants.  
Characteristics of Quick Failing Loans 
Much of the concern among attendees at the NeighborWorks® America–Atlanta Fed forum in 
May 2005 concerned highly foreclosure-prone lending in urban areas. While lending con-
ducted with the expectation that the borrower will not be able to repay is, at a minimum, 
unethical, and may run afoul of various state and federal laws regarding fraud and/or fair 
lending, it is difficult to definitively distinguish lending that is “too likely to fail” from that 
which is simply risky. Concentrations of loans that not only fail but do so soon after origina-
tion, however, are suggestive of a breakdown in oversight and/or underwriting standards. 
Knowing the characteristics of these loans and the areas where they predominate are both 
essential elements to the kind of collaborative policy solutions envisioned by 
NeighborWorks® America in its efforts to address foreclosure problems in Atlanta.  
In interpreting quick-foreclosure loans, it is important to note the difference between the time 
it takes for a borrower to first encounter difficulty in meeting his or her mortgage obligations, 
and the time it takes a lender to foreclose on a delinquent borrower. The first period relates to 
the quality of the underwriting and loan servicing. A borrower who quickly falls into 
delinquency is suggestive of a breakdown in oversight and/or underwriting standards. After 
that, the speed at which a lender is able to execute a foreclosure action is a function of 
business models and economic incentives in combination with applicable state law. Recall 
that Georgia is a “non-judicial” state, and hence foreclosers in Georgia are able to quickly 
pursue their actions.  
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Figure 3-3 shows the distribution of foreclosure filings by age of the loan. Age is calculated 
such that “zero” means the loan failed in the same calendar year as it was originated, “one” 
means the loan failed in the year after it was originated, and so on. All told, 17,805 failed 
loans experienced foreclosure filing in the calendar year they were originated or the 
subsequent year. The figure shows that most (84 percent) of the loans that fail do so in the six 
years following origination.  
 Figure 3-3: Age of Failed Loans, 2000:1–2005:1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The next subsection examines the characteristics of areas with high shares of “quick loan 
failures” (those in which the loan failed in the origination year or the year following origina-
tion). Figure 3-4 divides tracts into quintiles based on the share of failures that are “quick 
failures” so that, for example, the bottom quintile is comprised of the 115 census tracts where 
the loan failures that do occur are least likely to happen soon after origination. Conversely, 
top quintile areas are those where loan failures are most likely to happen quickly. Each 
grouping has about the same number of tracts and the number of total filings is fairly similar 
across the five groups. Total foreclosure filing rates are much higher in the top quick-filing 
quintile, however.  
The number of quick filings is also substantially higher when moving from low to high 
quintiles of quick-filing shares. Quick filings as a percentage of all foreclosure filings rise 
dramatically, from a low of 8.7 percent to a high of 39.6 percent, from bottom quintile to top 
quintile tracts. Owner-occupied share declines as quick-filing percentage increases, reflecting 
the fact that many of these tracts are in the city, where more homes are rented. Quick-file 
tracts also have higher shares of nonprime lending relative to others, though the relationship 
is not linear. The bottom panel of the table shows that the places with higher shares of quick-
failing loans have relatively high minority shares and relatively low incomes. 
Source: Equisystems, LLC.
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 Figure 3-4: Tract Characteristics by Quick Foreclosure Filing Share 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Sources: EquiSystems, LLC; Census 2000. 
 
Map 3-1 on the next page presents the spatial distribution of tracts in the highest quick-filing-
rate quintile. In the 115 tracts colored red, at least 28.4 percent of loans that failed did so 
quickly. The map highlights two key aspects of the spatial distribution of quick-filing-rate 
tracts. First, there is a substantial concentration of tracts with high quick-failure shares in the 
southern portion of the city, appearing to roughly overlap the area that was identified in Map 
2-3 as being the foreclosure hotspot. Second, not all tracts with high quick-fail shares are in 
this zone, with many clearly located in the suburbs. The source of these dispersed tracts is not 
clear. Some are suburban areas with housing market and socioeconomic characteristics more 
typical of the city. Others may be the result of localized fraud schemes affecting specific 
subdivisions. 
 
 
Tract Characteristics Bottom Second Third Fourth Top
Number of Tracts (%) 115             116             115             116             115             
Number of Total Fcl. Filings (%) 18,629        19,407        20,455        14,420        17,021        
Foreclosure Filing Rate (%) 2.0              1.7              1.7              1.6              3.0              
Number of Quick Fcl. Filings (%) 1,619          2,490          3,483          3,478          6,735          
Quick Fcl. Filings as Share of All Filings 8.7              12.8            17.0            24.1            39.6            
Owner Occupied Share (%) 70.1            73.8            67.5            62.1            49.7            
Non-Prime Share (%) 10.4            9.3              9.1              8.0              11.9            
Minority Share (%) 45.3            37.1            39.2            40.6            56.8            
African American Share (%) 34.5            24.2            27.1            25.3            45.5            
Average Median Household Income ($) 59,866        57,965        54,785        53,943        38,927        
Quick Filing Share Quinitle
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Map 3-1: Tracts in the Top Quintile for Quick-Foreclosure Shares  
 
 
Figure 3-5 examines the leading quick-foreclosing entities in high-foreclosure-rate tracts. In 
the figure they are ranked by the share of their activity in high filing rate areas that is quick 
filings. Only entities with at least five such filings are included, and the figure lists only those 
for whom quick fails are half or more of their total foreclosure activity in high-foreclosure-
filing areas. The table also includes the total number of filings for each entity, and the share 
of its filings that occurred in high-foreclosure-rate tracts. 
The figure shows that most of the leading quick foreclosers are small players that filed well 
under 100 total foreclosures in Atlanta over the five-year study period. Most also have fairly 
small numbers of quick filings, but these often make up the bulk of their filing activity. 
Together, these 49 entities accounted for 11.3 percent of quick filings and 3.9 percent of total 
lending in high-foreclosure-rate tracts. It is important to note that these figures do not indi-
cate the share of these entities’ overall mortgage market activity that ends up as failed loans. 
It is possible that the quick-failing loans presented in the figure represent a small portion of 
the total activity of these institutions. Overall, it makes sense to think of high shares of quick-
failing loans as discussed here as an indicator of potential problems, but further analysis is 
required to validate any such claim.  
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Figure 3-5: Entities Ranked by Quick Filing Share in High Foreclosure Tracts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Institution (Mortgagee)
Quick Filing 
Share in High 
Fcl. Rate Tracts
Quick Filings 
in High Fcl. 
Rate Tracts
Total Filings 
in High Fcl. 
Rate Tracts
Total Filings
High Fcl. Rate Tract 
Filings As a Share of 
Institution's Total
David G Kelley Jr. 100.0                 8                  8                  8                  100.0                          
Equity Lending Center LLC 100.0                 5                  5                  5                  100.0                          
Onward Financial LLC 100.0                 5                  5                  5                  100.0                          
United National Bank 100.0                 5                  5                  6                  83.3                            
Capstone Funding LLC 100.0                 5                  5                  7                  71.4                            
Ameriquest Funding 100.0                 7                  7                  14                50.0                            
US Capital Corp 94.4                   17                18                19                94.7                            
Bristol Investments LLC 90.0                   9                  10                11                90.9                            
City & State Factors 88.9                   8                  9                  10                90.0                            
Rattan Bhavinani 88.9                   8                  9                  10                90.0                            
Zahli International LLC 88.5                   23                26                31                83.9                            
Darren Hutcheson 87.5                   7                  8                  9                  88.9                            
Private Equity Inc 87.5                   7                  8                  9                  88.9                            
Ready Mortgage 86.7                   26                30                30                100.0                          
Notes LLC 85.7                   6                  7                  7                  100.0                          
ZBC Inc 85.7                   12                14                15                93.3                            
Calmco Servicing L P 87.5                   7                  8                  15                53.3                            
Fast Funding LLC 83.3                   5                  6                  8                  75.0                            
Equity Trust 83.3                   5                  6                  13                46.2                            
Doyal C Hopkins 81.8                   9                  11                13                84.6                            
New Century Mortgage 81.8                   9                  11                18                61.1                            
Omni Financial Services 80.4                   41                51                60                85.0                            
Long Beach Mortgage 79.2                   38                48                85                56.5                            
Harvest Mortgage Co Inc 79.2                   19                24                34                70.6                            
Olympus Servicing LP 78.1                   25                32                54                59.3                            
Lehman Capital 76.5                   13                17                40                42.5                            
Omni National Bank 74.4                   122              164              200              82.0                            
Empire Home Lending Corp 72.7                   8                  11                11                100.0                          
Olympus Servicing LP 71.9                   41                57                110              51.8                            
Sidney C. Berger 71.4                   5                  7                  9                  77.8                            
Realty Investors Funding LLC 69.2                   9                  13                14                92.9                            
Mid-Ohio Securities 68.4                   13                19                28                67.9                            
Ameriquest Mortgage 68.2                   15                22                41                53.7                            
Nationwide Mortgage Services 64.8                   57                88                120              73.3                            
DLJ Mortgage Capital Inc 64.4                   38                59                127              46.5                            
David K. Alexander 63.6                   7                  11                12                91.7                            
Residential Funding Corp 62.9                   22                35                100              35.0                            
RBMG Inc. 62.7                   32                51                88                58.0                            
Fremont Investment & Loan 61.5                   8                  13                25                52.0                            
Talbot State Bank 55.7                   34                61                179              34.1                            
FNMA (Perimeter Mortgage) 55.6                   10                18                21                85.7                            
FV-1 Inc 55.6                   5                  9                  27                33.3                            
Domestic Mortgage Inc. 54.5                   6                  11                12                91.7                            
Lib Properties Ltd. 54.4                   37                68                101              67.3                            
Taylor, Bean & Whitaker Mtg. 52.2                   12                23                61                37.7                            
CIT Group/Consumer Finance 52.0                   13                25                45                55.6                            
Equity One Inc. 50.0                   10                20                42                47.6                            
Yale Mortgage 50.0                   13                26                75                34.7                            
Capital Mortgage 50.0                 11              22              54               40.7                           
Total 70.2                   857              1,221            2,038            59.9                            
Share of All Filings - 11.3             3.9               2.3               -
Note: Only includes entities with at least five quick foreclosure filings in high foreclosure rate tracts. Entities are not 
grouped at holding company level.
Source: Equisystems, LLC.
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Quick Foreclosures and Nonprime Lending Shares 
In order to examine the tract level link between nonprime lending and foreclosure activity, 
Figure 3-6 presents the share of tracts with varying nonprime concentrations in each filing 
rate grouping. The relationship in the figure is dramatic and obvious. Tracts with higher 
foreclosure filing rates have more nonprime lending. Almost 60 percent of tracts in the 
lowest foreclosure filing rate group are in the bottom nonprime share quintile, and most of 
the rest are in the second-to-bottom quintile. In contrast, more than two-thirds of tracts in the 
highest foreclosure filing rate grouping are in the top nonprime quintile.  
Figure 3-6: Tract Nonprime Lending Share and Foreclosure Rates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Sources: EquiSystems, LLC; 2001–2002 HMDA. 
 
These results are unsurprising: by definition, nonprime lending is lending to more fore-
closure-prone borrowers. They do, however, serve to emphasize the policy challenges emerg-
ing from concentrated nonprime lending. The 87 tracts with five-year foreclosure rates and 
nonprime shares both exceeding 20 percent are obviously places where localities face the 
greatest challenge sustaining home values and preventing the social ills than can accompany 
concentrated foreclosures. 
Despite their conceptual linkage, little publicly available research has examined the spatial 
relationship between nonprime lending and quick foreclosures. Map 3-2 takes up this chal-
lenge, depicting areas that are either in the highest nonprime-share quintile (green), the 
highest quick-fail-share quintile (beige), or both (red). The map shows that areas with both 
characteristics are tightly grouped and located amid the cluster of intense foreclosure activity 
in the southern portion of the city. This result once again affirms the fact that particular 
neighborhoods are much more heavily influenced by foreclosure related phenomena. 
<5% 5-10% 10-20% >20% Total
Bottom (less than 5.8%) 58.5 9.1 3.9 0.8 19.9
Second (5.8 to 7.6%) 34.6 36.4 4.7 - 20.1
Third (7.6 to 11.6%) 6.9 46.9 22.5 4.6 20.1
Fourth (11.6 to 20.1%) - 7.7 48.8 28.8 19.9
Top (more tha 20.1%) - - 20.2 65.9 20.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Tracts 159 143 129 132 563
Non Prime Share Quintile Filing Rate Grouping
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Map 3-2: The Overlap Between Nonprime Lending and Quick Foreclosures 
 
 
Summary 
This section has examined issues that reflect conditions in the mortgage industry as they 
relate to foreclosure. Throughout, it emphasizes the effects of concentration. Concentration 
among originators, servicers, trustees and other participants leads to concentration among 
foreclosing entities. This is advantageous because it gives municipalities and community 
advocates powerful partners who often share their interests in mitigating the effects of fore-
closures or avoiding them altogether. Concentration among foreclosures themselves is the 
other theme of this section. In general, foreclosure filings, quick loan failures, and nonprime 
lending are all highly concentrated. Further, the tracts where these are most common overlap 
substantially in the southern part of the city. These findings argue strongly for an area focus 
for policy interventions intended to address foreclosure issues. The next section takes up this 
challenge by presenting possible avenues with which to improve outcome for all stakeholders 
in Atlanta. 
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Section 4: Policy Discussion 
With foreclosures on the rise throughout the Atlanta Metropolitan area, it is essential to find 
ways to minimize the associated economic and social costs on a wide range of stakeholders. 
In addition to their obvious impacts on distressed borrowers, foreclosures, generate losses for 
the mortgage industry, stress already tight county and local governments for the provision of 
foreclosure related services, and rob equity from neighboring homeowners and others with a 
financial interest in foreclosure-prone areas. 
In order to mitigate the negative effects of foreclosure, public officials must work with 
responsible mortgage industry and community leaders to reduce the incidence of poorly 
underwritten and/or fraudulent high-risk loans in distressed neighborhoods, and those that are 
foisted on unsuspecting borrowers wherever they may live. This initial step must be 
reinforced with longer term efforts to improve financial literacy by providing access to 
unbiased credit counseling for distressed borrowers. Meanwhile, state and local officials 
should also carefully review legislation governing the foreclosure process and work to ensure 
that it treats both borrowers and lenders fairly and does not work in a way that imposes 
undue spillover costs on communities. The following recommendations present some ideas 
about how responsible parties from business, government, and the nonprofit sector can work 
together to help reduce the number of loans going to foreclosure, and work to reduce the 
costs associated with the many foreclosures that will inevitably result from a robust system of 
mortgage credit provision. 
Policy Focus #1: Enhance the Ability to Monitor and Assess Foreclosure Patterns 
Amid very low-interest rates, rising house prices, and generally solid economic growth, fore-
closure filings more than doubled in Atlanta over the study period — from 15,000 to near 
35,000 annually. With the economy now showing signs of weakness and interest rates on the 
rise, further increases are likely in the years ahead. In spite of this current and projected 
boom in foreclosures and growing awareness of their adverse implications, there has been 
surprisingly little analysis of the cause and the extent of recent trends in Atlanta. This is due 
in no small way to the fact that there are little data available to state and local agencies 
charged with tracking the mortgage sector of the economy. Although information on 
individual foreclosures is generally on file at courthouses across the state, there has been but 
limited effort to systematically review and refine these records.  
Even in cases where these data are aggregated and made available, they are not intended to 
support regulatory oversight. The data used in this report compiled by EquiSystems, LLC, for 
example, are intended to alert potential buyers of homes scheduled for sale at the monthly 
foreclosure auction and, as such, lack many details concerning the characteristics of the mort-
gage loan, originator, noteholder and servicer that are essential to illuminating the factors that 
precipitate foreclosures. Tellingly, the EquiSystems data do not contain information on 
which homes are actually foreclosed upon and which ones cure. Developing the data needed 
to better monitor and assess foreclosure trends is an important first step. 
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Create a Loan Performance and Foreclosure Database. Clearly a comprehensive electronic 
database on loan performance is needed to support policy development and evaluation, and to 
detect and react to emerging foreclosure hotspots. Ideally such a database would include data 
on loan, lender, servicing agent, property and borrower characteristics sufficient to track 
foreclosures and ultimately to assess the key determinants of serious mortgage delinquency 
and default. At the state level, such data would support detailed analysis of the determinants 
of the foreclosure process, shape more effective legislation and regulations to mitigate 
individual and public-sector foreclosure costs, and minimize the extent of abusive lending 
and servicing practices that are linked to some unknown portion of the current foreclosure 
problem.  
More importantly, access to a database that could identify areas with elevated rates of fore-
closure filings would enable local city officials — working in partnership with local com-
munity-based organizations as well as interested mortgage servicers — to take appropriate 
remedial action. While creation of such a database could begin with efforts to improve and 
integrate basic county-level systems for recording and tracking mortgages and foreclosures, 
an alternative would be to simply work with private vendors such as EquiSystems to expand 
the data that they already gather and release. 
Enhance the Transparency of the Foreclosure Process. Better use of existing foreclosure 
information would go a long way to improve monitoring of foreclosure patterns and trends. 
For example, the current system in which MERS (the Mortgage Electronic Registry System) 
or the one of several trustees is listed as the party that initiates foreclosure proceedings, limits 
the ability of interested parties to track foreclosure trends at the neighborhood level. While 
such conventions reflect a reasonable desire not to require re-filing of public documents each 
time a loan is sold or its servicing arrangements changed, it makes sense to require that the 
actual noteholder and servicing agent be directly disclosed when a loan falls into serious 
delinquency and the borrower is threatened with foreclosure. Although not appearing on 
foreclosure filing documents, this information is already available through MERS. Indeed, 
agents working directly for either the servicing entity or the note-holder typically execute the 
filing of the foreclosure documents, and hence have the required information at their 
fingertips. In addition, other readily available information that could be included on the 
notice of intent to foreclose that would assist in the efforts to conduct appropriate foreclosure 
avoidance strategies and/or minimize the costs — both public and private — that result from 
foreclosure actions. 
Raise Public Awareness of the Municipal Costs of Foreclosures. Foreclosures impose numer-
ous costs that extend well beyond the simple issue of paying off a mortgage debt. For 
example, to the extent that foreclosed properties are “boarded up” or otherwise not well 
maintained during the foreclosure process, they may undermine the appeal, and ultimately 
the market value, of nearby properties. A recent study funded by the Homeownership 
Preservation Foundation and conducted by William Apgar and Mark Duda used Chicago data 
to account for both the foreclosure-related costs paid for by city of Chicago and Cook County 
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agencies, and the impact of foreclosures on area property values.14 Among other findings, the 
study reported that each additional foreclosure occurring in an area of concentrated fore-
closure could impose direct costs on local government agencies totaling more than $33,000 
and indirect effects on nearby property owners (in the form of reduced property values and 
home equity) of as much as an additional $220,000.  
Foreclosure-related costs of this magnitude raise a number of policy concerns. At the core of 
these concerns are questions about how best to reduce the financial burden foreclosures 
impose on stakeholders such as neighbors and municipalities that are not parties to the 
mortgage transaction, and how best to pay for the unavoidable costs that arise from the many 
foreclosures that will inevitably occur as a byproduct of a robust mortgage market. The fact 
that municipalities and residents living near the foreclosed property currently bear a 
significant portion of the aggregate cost imposed by mortgage failures is certainly an 
unintended consequence of efforts to attract mortgage capital to previously underserved 
inner-city areas. The result, however, is that local taxpayers and area residents are forced to 
shoulder burdens that are rightfully the responsibility of borrowers, lenders, and others that 
are direct parties to the mortgage transaction. While a similar study does not exist for Atlanta, 
development of such a study could help to focus attention on the public costs of foreclosure 
that extend beyond those suffered by the borrower and investor, and rally support for efforts 
that vigorously confront the adverse consequences of Atlanta’s foreclosure boom.  
Policy Focus #2: Work to Minimize the Adverse Consequences of Inevitable 
Foreclosures 
The increase in foreclosures in Atlanta has tested local governments’ ability to efficiently and 
effectively intervene in the foreclosure process on the behalf of stakeholders damaged by 
concentrated foreclosures. Even the highly concentrated foreclosures in inner-city areas have 
taken time to attract public-policy attention. Better data on foreclosure trends could help 
identify emerging hotspots as or before they develop. This report has documented the emer-
gence of areas of elevated foreclosures throughout the Atlanta region. Early intervention 
helps homeowners on the brink of foreclosure throughout metropolitan Atlanta stay in their 
homes. When foreclosure does occur, effective management and coordination of the 
foreclosure process could avoid much of this “collateral damage,” including efforts to ensure 
that foreclosed properties are quickly sold to new owner-occupants.  
Create a Special Foreclosure Hotspot Initiative. Given the high external costs associated with 
concentrated foreclosures, continuously monitoring foreclosure patterns is essential for 
detecting potential new hotspots as they emerge, for example by geocoding addresses of 
current foreclosure filings. Once a new hotspot is identified, public officials working in 
cooperation with industry and community leaders must be prepared to launch a “foreclosure 
hotspot protocol,” a plan formulated in advance of problem detection that describes specific 
actions that will minimize the negative consequences of extreme foreclosure levels.15 The 
                                                 
14  William Apgar and Mark Duda, Collateral Damage: The Municipal Impact of Today’s Mortgage 
Foreclosure Boom a report prepared for the Homeownership Preservation Foundation, May 11, 2005. Available 
online at www.hpfonline.org.  
15 Michigan recently enacted comprehensive reforms of tax foreclosures. For a discussion of how these reforms 
are enabling the city of Flint, Michigan, to better address issues relating its growing inventory of vacant and 
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hotspot protocol helps municipalities to intervene early, before the arrival of squatters or 
illegal activities that further aggravate the economic and social costs of concentrated 
foreclosure.16 Alternatively, early intervention could help prevent the appearance of a few 
foreclosures in a suburban development from undermining the quality of life for all of the 
residents in that area. As an example of what such a protocol might entail, municipal tax-
collection agencies could temporarily forbear on aggressively pursued delinquency judg-
ments against individual owner-occupants residing in foreclosure hotspots, if such efforts 
would allow the homeowners to remain in their homes, thus avoiding further concentrating 
foreclosures in already unstable areas.  
Connecting Distressed Homeowners to Impartial Credit Counseling. Many distressed borrow-
ers could save their loans, homes and credit standing if they knew where to turn for help. 
Effective counseling can make the difference between saving and losing their homes. 
Chicago and Dallas are both now partnering with the Credit Counseling Resource Center 
(CCRC), a national alliance of HUD-certified housing counseling agencies, to provide dis-
tressed borrowers access to information on how to avoid a pending foreclosure. To help build 
public trust in the CCRC approach, Chicago Mayor Richard Daley led a highly visible 
campaign to introduce the system and encourage distressed borrowers to seek help before it 
becomes too late. In Dallas, the CCRC hotline received over 600 calls the day after the 
mayor and city officials announced the program.  
In both Chicago and Dallas, callers have the opportunity to receive a wide range of 
counseling services. Since the CCRC has an ongoing relationship with participating loan 
servicers, as well as with various state and local sources of foreclosure avoidance assistance, 
callers can get general counseling information directly from CCRC, be put in contact directly 
with the entity servicing their own mortgage loan in order to explore the potential for a loan 
workout, or be referred to local sources of resources or assistance if appropriate. In each 
instance, the goal is to help distressed borrowers avoid foreclosure and find the best way to 
survive a temporary financial crisis, to mitigate the downside effects of a permanent income 
reduction, or to devise strategies to better manage their credit and/or to avoid foreclosure. 
Half of the credit counseling is paid for by lenders that have signed on to the program, while 
the city picks up the modest tab for the customers of others that have not joined the effort. 
Although it was not possible to avoid foreclosure in every instance, early experience suggests 
that as many as half of all program participants achieved “successful outcomes” (defined as 
any resolution of the situation that did not result in the property becoming vacant and 
abandoned).  
Institute Efficient Pre-Refinance Counseling. Because many foreclosures are associated with 
refinance lending, often to owners with substantial equity, interested parties should work to-
gether to develop a simple and effective form of pre-refinance counseling. Such a system 
would be most effective to the extent that it is quick, easy and convenient to use. It should 
                                                                                                                                                       
abandoned homes, see: Daniel T. Kildee. 2004. Reusing Forgotten Urban Land: The Genesee County Urban 
Land Redevelopment Initiative. Housing Facts and Findings 6(2). 
16 For further discussion of “Hotspot Initiatives,” see: William Apgar and Mark Duda. 2004. Preserving Home-
ownership: Community-Development Implications of the New Mortgage Market, a report prepared for the 
Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago. 
Mortgage Foreclosures in Atlanta: Patterns and Policy Issues 
30 
not, for example, attempt to get the entire set of physical loan documents reviewed prior to 
signing for a significant share of borrowers. Rather, such a system should allow would-be 
refinancers to vet their loan terms with qualified counselors in order to determine if they are 
appropriate given the borrower’s underwriting characteristics. A simple telephone call would 
be sufficient for such a service. 
Entities such as CCRC and CCC of Atlanta could provide such a service with existing assets. 
As with the preceding proposal, cost is not the primary obstacle to success, with foundations 
such as the Homeownership Preservation Foundation ready to fund a pilot project in Atlanta 
to test the effectiveness of the initiative (after which mortgage industry players and/or 
municipalities could be expected to foot the modest bill for a successful program). Rather, 
public awareness is the key, making participation by government agencies and nonprofit 
agencies essential. Ultimately, the goal of such an approach would be for most prospective 
refinancers, especially those in foreclosure hotspots, to be aware that a ten-minute phone call 
could help save them thousands of dollars over the life the loan and help them avoid the fate 
of those who lost equity or their homes by signing up for a bad loan. 
Create Programs to Transfer Properties to Community-Based Developers. Foreclosed proper-
ties, particularly in older cities and inner suburban areas, are likely to have experienced 
deferred maintenance and significant deterioration. After foreclosure and prior to a sale to a 
new owner-occupant is an ideal time to rehabilitate the properties to a standard that addresses 
all health and safety issues, as well as functional obsolescence of things like roofs and 
furnaces that can sink subsequent owner-occupiers financially. Community-based developers 
with strategies of building long-term, sustainable homeownership are often in the best 
position to manage the extensive rehabilitation process and then market and sell the property 
to prepared owner-occupants with solid financing, in part because they can access local, state 
and federal subsidies designed for this purpose. For example, in 2001, the Los Angeles City 
Council appropriated nearly $6 million to assist a major national nonprofit intermediary to 
purchase, rehab and sell a large portfolio of HUD-foreclosed properties. 
Not all communities can afford a program on the scale of Los Angeles’, but each can create 
relationships with a variety of institutions to structure programs that deeply discount or 
donate properties, enabling nonprofit developers to turn distressed properties into community 
assets. Not-for-profit organizations can begin the dialogue by identifying target areas where 
they want to strategically acquire properties. Financial institutions are often willing to 
identify REO properties in those locations that would make sense to discount or donate to 
these organizations. In many cases, servicers take into account the increased cost they would 
incur by holding and marketing the property for a higher price as opposed to a quick but 
deeply discounted sale to a credible community-based developer. By showing success on a 
few properties — a thorough rehab and a timely sale to an owner-occupant — not-for-profit 
organizations can set the stage for an ongoing REO discount or donation program. 
Work to Sell Foreclosed Properties to Lower-Income Homebuyers. Given the high costs of 
substantial rehab, it may make sense to focus on homes that are less in need of major re-
habilitation, but that would still expand homeownership opportunities to lower-income buy-
ers. Unfortunately, foreclosed properties sold through Atlanta’s monthly auction system often 
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fall into the hands of speculators that either quickly resell the property “as-is” to un-
suspecting buyers, or convert the unit to rental, and in doing so erode the homeowner base of 
the neighborhood. Community groups can work to provide lower-income buyers the 
information and assistance needed (including access to appropriate rehabilitation funds) to 
purchase their home directly through the foreclosure auction process. Not only would this bid 
some speculators out of the process, but it could be an especially valuable option for expand-
ing the number of lower-income borrowers able to purchase and rehab one of many 
thousands of relatively new homes now being lost to foreclosure in the Atlanta suburbs.  
Even more promising would be a program that helps new owners purchase a home directly 
from an owner facing foreclosure. By negotiating a “preforeclosure sale,” the program would 
avoid the costs of foreclosure. Because such a sale would greatly reduce the cost of fore-
closure for the noteholder and potentially the servicer as well, mortgage industry participants 
should be willing to get involved in such an effort if it could be shown to function effectively. 
Working cooperatively with concerned servicers, it would be possible to identify homes that 
are in reasonably good repair, but nevertheless are moving toward foreclosure. One approach 
is for the servicer to offer a cash-for-keys type settlement that leaves the borrower something 
with which to start over, and then quickly resell the property to the loan-ready borrower. By 
minimizing the costs associated with foreclosure, such an approach could be beneficial to the 
servicoer or the investor, not to mention both the former and new homeowners. 
Identifying new sources of funding for foreclosure avoidance. While the magnitude of the 
costs is unknown, foreclosures — especially those in hotspots — are widely thought to trig-
ger significant costs to local, state and federal governments. Consequently, increasing 
funding for foreclosure-avoidance efforts can save money that public agencies would have 
been forced to spend cleaning up the mess later on. Determining how government money 
could best be deployed is a challenge, however. One promising option is to make funds avail-
able to enhance loss-mitigation and foreclosure-avoidance efforts already employed by 
servicers. Since resources are likely to be limited, localities must create clear borrower and 
neighborhood eligibility standards to ensure that limited public funds target those situations 
that are most deserving of assistance and/or produce the greatest public benefit.  
Equally problematic is obtaining the funding needed to support these initiatives, especially in 
an era of limited public resources. One solution to this problem builds on a proposal by the 
Coalition for Fair and Affordable Lending, a national organization representing nonprime 
lenders.17 Under this approach, Congress would require that nonprime lenders pay a modest 
fee into a central fund when they originate a mortgage. This fund could then be used to 
defray the municipal costs associated with foreclosure, support state and local efforts to 
streamline the foreclosure process, and expand local foreclosure-avoidance initiatives. 
Recognizing that they will inevitably bear some of the costs, however, municipalities must be 
prepared to use their own community-development resources to advance foreclosure-
avoidance efforts, both to reduce their own exposure and to help families in distress.  
                                                 
17  See: National Standards for Mortgage Lending Gains Momentum; Industry Outlines ‘Reasonable 
Compromise Proposals,’ press release dated November 17, 2003, from the Coalition for Fair and Affordable 
Lending. 
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Policy Focus #3: Reduce Foreclosures by Reducing the Incidence of Abusive Lending 
While many factors have undoubtedly contributed to Atlanta’s foreclosure boom, data pre-
sented in this report indicate that at least some of the increase stems from recent increases in 
abusive forms of nonprime lending. In particular, the fact that relatively high shares of loans 
foreclose less than two years after origination is a clear indication that many, though not all, 
such loans were made with little regard to borrowers’ actual ability to repay. That these 
trends continue today is another reason to suggest that the Atlanta foreclosure boom has yet 
to run its course. Moreover they are a reminder that the best foreclosure-avoidance strategy is 
to prevent foreclosure-prone loans being made.  
Deploy Effective Consumer Counseling. In the face of aggressive push marketing by non-
prime lenders, community-based organizations must ramp up their efforts to ensure that low-
income borrowers get the best priced mortgage credit available to them in the marketplace. 
One approach some groups have used is to host homebuyer fairs and invite a prescreened 
group of mortgage brokers and lenders to participate. These homebuyer fairs seek to educate 
prospective buyers, help them identify specific mortgage products, and link them up with 
providers committed to finding products that are best suited to meet their needs. 
Drawing attention to abusive brokers and lenders can be another way to warn potential bor-
rowers of truly abusive lending practices. Consumer awareness campaigns, such as the “Stop 
Before You Borrow” initiated by the Fulton County Office of Housing, can help unsus-
pecting buyers and borrowers from falling prey to abusive lenders. Conducting additional 
evaluation of loans originated by lenders with a record of foreclosing relatively quickly after 
a loan was originated, would be a relatively easy way to identify other potentially abusive 
loans and provide foreclosure avoidance assistance in a timely manner.  
Enhance Consumers’ Capacity to Protect Themselves. Unfortunately, even the best designed 
education and outreach efforts can be easily swamped in a marketplace characterized by 
aggressive outreach in which some sophisticated, abusive, nonprime lenders promise to 
approve a mortgage application in a matter of hours, if not minutes, even for borrowers with 
“bad credit.” In the face of this marketing onslaught, many community groups are taking a 
more aggressive approach and expanding their capacity work with buyers individually to 
search for the best mortgages. Of course, for such a service to be helpful, community groups 
must keep abreast of mortgage market trends and developments in mortgage products, and be 
recognized by potential borrowers as a trusted source of information. Indeed, some com-
munity-based organizations are already gearing up to develop a mortgage brokerage business 
with the explicit goal of using their good standing in the neighborhood to become a “buyer’s 
broker,” while at the same time earning a small fee for offering this service like any other 
mortgage broker.18 Like the trusted advisors available to many higher-income borrowers, a 
                                                 
18 Community-based organizations have to be mindful of the real or even perceived conflict of interest inherent 
in assuming the role of a buyer’s broker. For example, to the extent that an organization receives funding from a 
particular lending institution, it may be pressured to recommend this institution’s products even in situations 
where more advantageous products exist in the marketplace. Needless to say, an organization’s failure to 
provide proper safeguards to avoid either a real or perceived conflict of interest would quickly erode the trust 
that community residents have placed in them.  
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buyer’s broker would provide lower-income and/or less knowledgeable borrowers access to 
information on available mortgage terms and pricing. Buyer’s brokers would help borrowers 
qualify for and procure a loan but, unlike mortgage brokers, would have incentives that 
ensure they work on behalf of the borrower.  
Provide Consumers with Better Information. Though some well capitalized and technically 
sophisticated community groups have the ability to launch brokerage operations, many lack 
the resources and scale necessary to make such activities cost effective. Fortunately, there are 
other avenues through which nonprofits can help borrowers search for better mortgages. 
Borrowing from automobile blue books, nonprofits could periodically make “rate sheets” 
available to recent graduates of homebuying courses, at homebuyer fairs, or to anyone 
interested in purchasing a home in their area. Armed with knowledge of their credit score, 
income and other characteristics, these rate sheets could help borrowers shop for the best 
product, as well as better evaluate unsolicited offers. Along these lines, the Ford Foundation 
recently provided funding to support the development of “The Mortgage Grader,” a privately 
owned system that will provide a link between national-brand lenders and community 
counseling organizations. With Mortgage Grader, community-based agencies will have ac-
cess to loan quotes that will match the best loans that participating lenders offer in the mar-
ketplace. Working to enable borrowers or their trusted advisors to be better shoppers and to 
resist the marketing practices of abusive lenders would go a long way toward not only 
reducing the incidence of predatory lending, but also toward stemming the growth of 
foreclosures that inevitably follow in the wake of these predatory lending practices.  
Expand Legal and Regulatory Efforts to Ban Deceptive Lending Practices. Increasingly, states 
and localities are ramping up efforts to eliminate deceptive and abusive mortgage lending 
practices. While these efforts have not always reflected an awareness of the extent to which 
nonprime lending has expanded access to mortgage credit for millions of previously 
underserved borrowers, they legitimately attempt to address the fact that the recent explosion 
of nonprime lending has provided cover that enables many less-than-reputable operators to 
flourish. One clear sign of “bad lending practices” is the share of loans originated by a par-
ticular entity that go bad in the first year or two. In most instances, a quick foreclosure points 
to inadequate attention to underwriting and in more serious instances can reflect fraudulent 
behavior on the part of the mortgage broker or lender responsible for originating the loan.  
Though tracking the loan performance of all loans made by a specific lender would be pos-
sible with data maintained at local court houses, this is no easy task. An easy substitute is to 
turn the spotlight on those entities appearing frequently on the list of foreclosures occurring 
on loans aged less than two years. While sorting out fraudulent lending from simple 
incompetence, lack of due diligence, or even bad luck is challenging, it can be argued that 
brokers or lenders found with a high number of quick foreclosures should not be permitted to 
push-market their products to vulnerable people and communities. Armed with simple 
tracking statistics of the type developed for this report, regulatory officials could examine 
carefully the entities that originated quick-foreclosing loans and take appropriate legal 
remedies where warranted, ranging from a simple suspension of their license to lend in the 
state, to more serious penalties, including fines or even criminal sanctions.  
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With foreclosures on the rise and strong indications of further increases in the future, all 
states, including Georgia, should take a new look at model antipredatory lending legislation 
now in place in North Carolina and elsewhere. While many industry advocates argue that 
expanding regulation at the state level will deny credit-impaired borrowers access to 
mortgage loans, these claims largely miss the point. The question is not how many nonprime 
loans are made in any given period, but whether these loans offer borrowers a chance to 
become and remain a homeowner until they chose another path. Luring an unsuspecting 
borrower into a loan that has a high probability of failure certainly is no favor to the borrower, 
not to mention the municipalities left to clean up the mess of abusive lending. 
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Appendix: Data Cleaning and Preparation 
The data used in this report are a complete list of foreclosure filings in 12 metropolitan 
Atlanta counties. Records enter the database following borrower default when the noteholder 
or noteholder’s agent begins the formal process of foreclosure. They cover the period 
beginning January 2000 and ending in March 2005. The data were obtained from Equi-
Systems, LLC, publishers of The Atlanta Foreclosure Report, a subscription-based monthly 
summary of properties to be sold at the subsequent month’s foreclosure auction (held the first 
Tuesday of each month).19 The database is therefore a comprehensive listing of properties 
with loans that are in severe enough difficulty that they come within a few weeks of being 
offered at auction by the noteholder, though not all are ultimately offered and/or sold. Equi-
Systems estimates that 30 percent of the records in their database result in consummated 
foreclosures. The duplicate removal we perform during our data editing (described below) in-
creases this percentage among the records used in this analysis, but we are unable to know 
the exact share of the records here that represent consummated foreclosures as opposed to 
extremely severe delinquencies. 
In order to prepare the raw EquiSystems data for analysis, we took several data-cleaning 
steps, as detailed in Figure A-1. From an initial file of 145,776 records, we first dropped one 
county (Hall County) for which EquiSystems provides data but for which we could not 
obtain matching building-permit data needed in the analysis. We next dropped records that 
our geocoding engine placed outside the remaining 12-county study area, as well as all non-
residential loans.20 We then focused the sample slightly by dropping very small (less than 
$5,000) and very large (more than $5 million) loans. All of these steps caused modest de-
clines in the population of foreclosure records, reducing it by a total of about 8,000 records. 
 Figure A-1: Impact of Data Cleaning 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A larger reduction in the dataset was caused by the fact that the possibility of loans curing 
prior to auction date means a significant share of the records in the raw EquiSystems 
database appear in more than one month. In order to prevent double counting, we used each 
loan-property combination only once, retaining the first appearance of each and discarding 
                                                 
19 www.equisystems.com/page_2.htm.  
20 Junior liens were kept in the database and comprise approximately 5 percent of the sample. 
Edit Records Removed Remaining Records
Raw records from Equisystems 145,776                          
Drop Hall County -3,047 142,729                          
Drop records geocoded outside the 12 county study 
area -2,711 140,018                          
Drop non-residential records -2,193 137,825                          
Drop loans less than $5,000 -244 137,581                          
Drop loans greater than $5,000,000 -13 137,568                          
Drop multiple records -47,459 90,109                           
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all subsequent ones. Making this edit drops nearly 47,500 records from the remaining 
database. 
Several other important methodological decisions underpin the analysis presented in this 
report. The first of these concerns the denominator we use to construct census-tract-level 
foreclosure rates. Using neighborhood (i.e., census tract) characteristics from 2000 is appro-
priate for most of the indicators we examine here, such as income and racial characteristics, 
because these generally do not change significantly over periods as short as five years. The 
number of housing units and hence the number of mortgages in an area can change 
significantly in a five-year period, however. The uneven rate at which the housing stock ex-
pands in different areas therefore made it important to update the 2000 Census figures on the 
number of mortgages in each tract in order that our foreclosure rates not be biased downward 
in tracts where the housing stock was expanding. 
Since we do not have tract- or county-level information on growth in mortgage lending over 
the study period, we used the rate of building permit issuance to proxy for it. Because permit 
data are aggregated to the county level, we multiply the number of mortgages outstanding as 
of 2000 at the tract level by the county level increase in permits during the study period. This 
yields imperfect estimates of the number of loans outstanding but is preferable to simply 
using unadjusted 2000 figures because it reflects some, though not all, of the neighborhood-
level variation in lending growth since 2000. Figure A-2 shows permitting by county and the 
multipliers for outstanding mortgage levels that we calculate from it. The figure indicates that 
county-level growth in the housing stock ranged from a low of 11.6 percent to a high of 69.6 
percent in the five years beginning in 2000. 
 Figure A-2: Building Permits Issued in Study Counties, 2000:1–2004:4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Another concern involved the accuracy of the geocoding through which property information 
in the EquiSystems data were mapped to specific census tracts. Of the 90,109 records in the 
cleaned data, 75,978 (84.3 percent) could be coded directly to the tract level. The remaining 
14,131 could be geocoded only to zip codes. In order to avoid losing these records we did the 
following. First, we used the 75,978 directly geocoded loans to determine what share of fore-
County Permits Issued 2000 level Change (%)
Bartow 5,099                      15,202                    33.5
Cherokee 16,197                    36,754                    44.1
Clayton 11,698                    45,161                    25.9
Cobb 25,213                    142,790                  17.7
Dekalb 20,714                    134,885                  15.4
Douglas 7,596                      21,113                    36.0
Fayette 4,624                      24,373                    19.0
Forsyth 14,192                    26,287                    54.0
Fulton 25,278                    146,783                  17.2
Gwinnett 46,290                    134,802                  34.3
Henry 18,303                    26,315                    69.6
Rockdale 3,560                      30,674                  11.6
Total 198,764                  785,139                  25.3
Source: Census Bureau, Monthly New Privately-Owned Residential Building Permits.
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closures in each zip code occurred in each of the zip code’s census tracts. We then assumed 
that the shares for each tract within a zip code were the same in the 14,131 records coded to 
the zip code level as in the 75,978 directly coded foreclosures. The actual tract-level number 
of foreclosures used in our analysis, and in construction of the foreclosure rates presented 
throughout this report, is therefore a combination of foreclosed properties geocoded directly 
to the tract level (84.3 percent) and foreclosed properties for which the census-tract location 
needed to be imputed from zip code–level geocoding. 
